

Oct 18

40

1 **Privileged and Confidential--DRAFT**

2
3 Narrative Post Task Force Weekend Revisions 10/18/2004 2:56 PM

4
5 *(What Have We Learned?)*

6
7 Nearly eight weeks ago, CBS news reported that an anonymous governmental source had
8 disclosed that the FBI was investigating the involvement of two AIPAC employees in a
9 "spy ring" involving AIPAC and an employee of the Department of Defense. As many
10 of you will remember all too well, a spate of other news stories—fueled by illegal leaks
11 from law enforcement—followed in the proceeding days.

12
13 Within hours of the initial revelations in the press and throughout the days and weeks that
14 followed, we communicated with each of you; by fax, by email and by conference call to
15 tell you what we knew about the nature of this alleged investigation. The most important
16 thing we told you then I will repeat today:

17
18 AIPAC has done nothing wrong. Neither AIPAC nor any member of our staff has broken
19 any law.

20
21 *(PAUSE)*

22
23 We also told you that virtually all we knew about the nature of this investigation we had
24 learned from press leaks by the authorities. Since then, Abbe Lowell, a member of
25 AIPAC's legal team, has met with the US Attorney overseeing the investigation. At that
26 meeting, he received only very limited information about what this investigation is all
27 about. Other facts we have pieced together from press reports and discussions we have
28 had with some of the people who the authorities have questioned. Today, I want to
29 update you—AIPAC's top leadership—on what we have learned.

30
31 Before I do so, let me warn you. What you are about to hear may shock you. It may
32 make you angry. You will have the urge to interrupt and ask me how what I am telling
33 you could happen in America, to our community. You will want to turn to your neighbor
34 to share your outrage.

35
36 *(Lower inflection, more serious)*

37
38 I am asking that you do neither.

39
40 *(PAUSE)*

41
42 It is simply too important that you—AIPAC's most important members—absorb the full
43 dimensions of what has transpired and what it could mean not only to AIPAC, but also to
44 our community. There will be ample time for all of your questions and comments after
45 this briefing.

46

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47 We have with us today a distinguished guest who will participate in today's discussion,
48 TDB lawyer. TBD is one of the legal community's most authoritative figures on xxxxx.
49 He will help you understand the legal issues involved. (REWRITE once his remarks are
50 known.)

51

52 Before we begin, I want to underscore the confidential nature of this discussion. The
53 issues we are about to discuss have important ramifications—legal and otherwise—for
54 the individuals involved, AIPAC and our entire community. Please do not discuss
55 anything you hear today outside this room, especially with the media.

56

57 We are sharing this information with you for two reasons. First and most importantly, we
58 told you that we would keep you, the leadership of AIPAC, fully informed as we learned
59 more about this investigation. Secondly, if history is any guide, information about this
60 investigation could be unlawfully leaked—and misrepresented—to the press at any time.
61 We want to do our best to ensure that what you learn about this investigation, you learn
62 from us.

63

64 Let's begin with what the facts are, as we know them.

65

66 Despite leaks in August by governmental authorities to the media intimating that two
67 AIPAC employees—Director of Foreign Policy Issues Steve Rosen and Deputy Director
68 of Foreign Policy Issues Keith Weissman—were part of an espionage ring,

69

- 70 • No AIPAC employee has ever sought secret information on behalf of the Israeli
71 government, and no evidence has been presented by the investigators suggesting
72 that they did.
- 73
- 74 • No AIPAC staff person was ever given, nor did any AIPAC employee ever accept
75 any paper, written report or any other tangible material that was designated as
76 classified, despite those initial press leaks alleging that some secret document was
77 exchanged.
- 78
- 79 • No AIPAC staff person has asked any U.S. government official for information it
80 would be illegal for an AIPAC employee to have. As everyone in this room
81 knows, we don't need illegal information to do our work.
- 82
- 83 • No AIPAC employee ever tried to buy information from a U.S. government
84 official, or received any cash or valuables in exchange for information they had.
- 85

86

86 When one hears "spy ring" alleged on the evening news, one would assume that
87 one or more of these activities would be involved. You would think that an AIPAC
88 employee was being accused of asking for, buying, taking or profiting from information
89 it is illegal for them to have. Yet, based on what we know, none of these activities are
90 even the focus of this investigation.

91

92 What then, is this investigation really about? What are Steve and Keith **apparently**
93 **suspected** of doing?
94
95 Listening. That's what they are suspected of. Sitting at a table, over a cup of coffee or
96 lunch, listening to ideas and information that Pentagon Analyst Larry Franklin
97 volunteered to them. And afterwards, sharing that information as they routinely do after
98 similar meetings with Administration officials such as Franklin every day. Sharing it
99 with you on conference calls and during briefings in your community. Sharing it with
100 other policymakers in Washington during discussions about where different agencies and
101 principals stand in a particular policy debate. Sharing it with Israeli officials as part of
102 our work to help them understand how America views its relationship with Israel and its
103 priorities in the Middle East.
104
105 Such conversations are common in Washington. AIPAC leaders and staff aren't the only
106 ones that have them. So do staff from other advocacy organizations, analysts from think
107 tanks, professors from universities, leaders of every Fortune 500 Company, foreign
108 diplomats including Israeli officials and members of the media. They too, like us, meet
109 every day with members of Congress and people working in every part of the
110 Administration, from the White House to the State Department to the Pentagon, to
111 discuss policy issues.
112
113 Our country's policymakers rely on AIPAC for its insights into what other parties in the
114 foreign policy discussion are thinking. It is not unusual, for example, for a National
115 Security Advisor or Assistant Secretary of State to ask me or other AIPAC leaders what
116 the perspective is of Israeli leaders on a particular topic, or our sense of the support on
117 Capitol Hill for a particular initiative.
118
119 Obviously, we also engage in frequent discussion with Israeli government officials at
120 both the embassy in Washington and in Israel. Let me emphasize something everybody
121 in this room already knows, AIPAC is an American organization made up of American
122 citizens who advocate for American policies in the Middle East generally and toward
123 Israel in particular. **We don't** act on instructions or directions from the Israeli
124 government.
125
126 **We do** share information and insights with Israeli officials. We learn from them what
127 Israeli leaders think on a variety of topics, from next steps to solve the conflict with the
128 Palestinians to how best to tackle the war on terror. Israeli officials get from us our
129 impressions, based on our discussions with American officials, what are the priorities or
130 concerns of American policymakers when it comes to America's relationship with Israel.
131
132 **So the fact that AIPAC staff would have a conversation with someone in Larry**
133 **Franklin's position, an individual responsible for covering Iran policy issues for the**
134 **Pentagon, and communicate what they have learned to others, is not surprising. It**
135 **is routine. It is what AIPAC employs them to do.**
136
137 **(PAUSE)**

138

139 **The fact that the FBI taped at least two of those conversations, one held in June**
140 **2003 and the other in July 2004, however, stunned us.**

141 **(PAUSE)**

142

143 When we first learned this, we were as shocked as you probably are now. While we
144 believe AIPAC has a special and unique role in America's foreign policy debate, the day-
145 to-day nuts and bolts of what our organization does are no different than the day-to-day
146 operations of many organizations in Washington. It was and it still is unthinkable to us
147 that the way AIPAC works would arouse suspicion.

148

149 During the conversations that the authorities apparently taped, Larry Franklin volunteered
150 information and perspectives on a variety of topics. All of them were subjects that had
151 been widely covered in the press. We now understand that he sprinkled the word
152 "classified" into at least two conversations. Because Franklin characterized some of the
153 information in this way, the authorities are contending that Steve and Keith violated the
154 law, *merely by sitting at the table, passively listening, to information they didn't even*
155 *solicit*.

156

157 Some of you may be asking, why Keith or Steve jump up and run out of the room when
158 they heard the word "classified"? After all, those of us raised on Cold War thrillers know
159 that the word classified is describe "top secret" military plans on how to beat the Soviets
160 and the like. Right?

161

162 **(PAUSE)**

163

164 Well, not exactly.

165

166 The word classified has come to refer to literally millions of pages of government
167 material, covering everything from plans for the movement of U.S. troops in Iraq or the
168 architecture of one our nuclear facilities, to what was said in a discussion amongst
169 policymakers about what to do about social security, farm subsidies or for that matter,
170 Iran.

171

172 Max Frankel, the legendary executive editor of the New York Times once wrote about
173 this issue that "Everything that our Government does, plans, thinks, hears, and
174 contemplates in the realms of foreign policy is stamped and treated as secret, and then
175 unraveled by that same government, by the Congress and by the press in one continuing
176 round of professional and social contacts and cooperative and competitive exchanges of
177 information."

178

179 The word classified is not a legal term. It is an administrative term, telling federal
180 employees what information they should or shouldn't share with others.

181 Common sense—and the law—dictates that troop movements and policy debates are not
182 the same. That is why many people, including many members of Congress and the
183 media, have been sharply critical of the process for classifying information, contending

184 that what the classification process has become is really a way to keep government away
185 from the people. While sharing classified information about troop movements,
186 something that affects our nation's security is *clearly illegal*; sharing other types of
187 classified information is not. (ALTERNATIVE IS TO TAKE THIS PARAG-OUT)

188
189 *Let me be clear. AIPAC does NOT ask for information it is illegal for us to have.*
190 *We do* routinely meet with government employees who have access to a wide range of
191 information. Some of this information is public, some could be private, and some could
192 be classified. How government officials compartmentalize what they know from public
193 sources, private sources, or classified sources when they talk with people outside the
194 government is something that AIPAC staff assumes government officials know how to
195 do. Furthermore, in a town like Washington, where government officials are known to
196 exaggerate their importance and access to sensitive information, the use of the word
197 "classified" in conversation would not necessarily stand out as significant

198
199 We believe that what the authorities are suggesting—that Keith and Steve committed a
200 crime merely by being passive listeners to a government employee *volunteering*
201 information they didn't even ask for—is a gross misapplication of the law. I believe this
202 will become clearer to you after I walk you through the details of the conversations
203 themselves, and TBD lawyer explains what the law actually says.

204
205 AIPAC staff met with Larry Franklin four times over a two-year period between late
206 2002 and 2004.

207
208 **Let me describe what occurred during those meetings.**

209
210 *(Winter of 2002/03)*

211
212 Steve and Keith were first introduced to Franklin at a gathering of professionals working
213 foreign policy professionals in the winter of 2002-03. Franklin was one of a handful of
214 experts in the Department of Defense specializing in Iran. Given AIPAC's interest in the
215 topic, he was the type of Administration official with whom Steve and Keith would be
216 interested in maintaining contact.

217
218 *(The first meeting: June 9, 2003)*

219
220 As part of their routine contact with Administration officials, Keith arranged for him and
221 Steve to meet Franklin for lunch on June 9, 2003. During lunch, Franklin volunteered
222 information that there had been a policy discussion concerning Iran within the
223 Administration and that there was a draft memorandum on the topic working its way
224 through the policymaking process for a decision in the White House. He stated that there
225 had been disagreements over whether to be "tougher" on Iran or more conciliatory and
226 that a decision had been made at the agency levels that involved some kind of tougher
227 policy. He said the memorandum had been stalled for some time at the National Security
228 Council.

229

230 Franklin did not show the memorandum to Steve or Keith. They did not know about its
231 existence until Mr. Franklin brought it up. During the conversation, Steve and Keith did
232 get the impression that Franklin was suggesting that Steve and Keith help unclog the
233 logjam on this policy by getting this information to the right place in the White House.
234 Given the influential role policymakers know AIPAC has in the overall foreign policy
235 debate in Washington, it is not unusual—and definitely not illegal—for policymakers
236 with one point of view to try and enlist AIPAC's support in lobbying those with a
237 different point of view.

238

239 *(The second meeting: June 21, 2003)*

240

241 A week or so later, an article appeared in *The Washington Post* on June 15, 2003 written
242 by Michael Dobbs entitled, "Pressure Builds for President to Declare Policy on Iran." In
243 the article Dobbs talked about the debate going on in the Administration over the future
244 direction of America's policy toward Iran. Steve and Keith then decided to arrange
245 another meeting on June 21 to discuss the dispute that Mr. Franklin had mentioned and
246 that had now been reported in the media.

247

248 The three again discussed the policy dispute in general terms. During the meeting, Mr.
249 Franklin was focused on going over what he termed the horrible things that the
250 government of Iran had perpetrated around the world. During the meeting, Franklin
251 referred back to a single piece of paper he brought with him, that based on the type of
252 things he was saying to Keith and Steve, contained or described a list of atrocities
253 committed by the government of Iran. The list contained items that had been widely
254 reported, from Iran's funding of terrorism to its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction.

255

256 Some news reports have indicated that Mr. Franklin provided or showed Steve and Keith
257 a draft of a document called the national security presidential directive on Iran. Franklin
258 did not show or give them either the page he seemed to be referring to during the
259 discussion, nor any other document, during that meeting or at any other time.

260

261 Other news reports indicate that Franklin may have stated that some of the information he
262 was sharing in the conversation was classified. If Franklin did use that word -- either
263 because he was already cooperating with the government and was asked to do so in order
264 to entrap Steve and Keith-- or for any other reason -- it did not register with either Keith
265 or Steve as being meaningful.

266

267 First of all, the discussion at lunch concerned general, public policy issues that had been
268 reported in the media. Secondly, Franklin was known for his dismissal of governmental
269 sources, particularly classified ones. He preferred to rely more on his own use of
270 unorthodox public albeit esoteric archives as well as information gleaned from
271 conversations with his own personal contacts, many of whom his governmental
272 colleagues considered unreliable. Franklin tried to give an air of mystery to all that he
273 said, making it impossible to know if the information he was sharing was truly classified
274 or gleaned from his own esoteric sources of information and relationships.

275

276 Steve and Keith concluded after the lunch that Mr. Franklin exaggerated his contacts and
277 information and might describe his information as being sensitive or classified only to
278 aggrandize himself. In fact, Steve decided after that meeting that it was not worth his
279 time to see or speak with Mr. Franklin again. Nonetheless, because Franklin's job was to
280 evaluate Iran policy for the Pentagon, Steve asked Keith to touch base with him from
281 time to time.

282 *(The third meeting: July 9, 2004)*

283

284 It would be a year before Keith would call Franklin to meet again. In July, 2004, Keith
285 contacted Franklin to set up another lunch. Keith invited Steve to join them, but Steve
286 declined. On July 9, Keith and Franklin met. They had a very general discussion of
287 events in the Middle East and Iran.

288

289 *(The fourth meeting: July 26, 2004)*

290

291 **Less than two weeks after that meeting, Franklin called Keith to have lunch, telling**
292 **him he had something important to tell him.**

293

294 Keith was about to leave on vacation and tried to put the meeting off – Franklin said it
295 could not wait. What Keith did not know at the time but what now appears to be true is
296 that Franklin had been cooperating with law enforcement. Apparently, he was anxious to
297 meet so the authorities could record their discussion. They agreed to meet on July 26.

298

299 When they met, Franklin seemed agitated. During the conversation, he stated that he had
300 sensitive or classified information from an intelligence source that involved people being
301 killed and lives at stake. The key information that Franklin was trying to impart was that
302 Iranians had targeted Israelis in Iraq for death, kidnapping, or injury. Once again,
303 Franklin asked for help getting this information to the right place in the White House.

304

305 At no time during the meeting did Franklin give any document or material to Keith. At no
306 time did Franklin show Keith any paper or material marked classified in any way. At no
307 time, did Franklin tell Keith anything about U.S. operations, policies, directives, or plans.

308

309 While Franklin's formulation was startling, Keith did not find the substance of what he
310 said particularly surprising. Seymour Hersch had already reported in an in-depth piece in
311 *The New Yorker* a month earlier that Israelis were in northern Iraq to assist the Kurds.
312 Extensive information about Iranian agents operating in Iraq had also been reported. To
313 Keith, an Iran expert and a seasoned analyst whose job it was to connect the dots between
314 disparate pieces of information, Franklin's statements reflected a potentially logical
315 conclusion that could be drawn from publicly available data rather than a "state secret."

316

317 After the meeting, Keith did what he often does after such meetings. He shared what he
318 had learned with Steve, wove it into briefings when he went on the road to address many
319 of you, factored it into his ongoing analysis of Iran and shared the insights with Israeli
320 officials and other analysts with whom he was in regular contact.

321

322 **This is it – the conduct in question.** The authorities are investigating Keith and Steve
323 and AIPAC for violation of the laws covering classified information, merely because they
324 *heard* information they did not solicit and, in one instance, at a meeting they didn't even
325 request that apparently was a government set-up.
326

327 **We believe that the suggestion that Steve or Keith acted illegally is a gross**
328 **misapplication of the letter and intent of the law.**
329

330 *Let me underscore again --* AIPAC does not ask for information that it is illegal for us to
331 have. The purpose of our discussions with individuals in the foreign policy establishment
332 is to exchange views on information that is lawfully provided.
333

334 So these are the facts. We would now like to turn this over to TBD to discuss the law as
335 it applies to this situation.
336 -----

337 *(What is the law?.)*
338

339 **INSERT TBD LAWYER**
340

341 **[We need to describe why Steve and Keith haven't broken any U.S. laws in 3-4 very**
342 **easy to understand legal points]**
343

344

345 -----

346

347

348

349 **(TRANSITION OFF OF TBD LAWYER, THIS OR SOMETHING SIMILAR)**
350

351 *(Why is this happening?)*
352

353 As TBD has just explained, neither Keith nor Steve, nor AIPAC, has done anything
354 wrong. So why are the authorities fixated on these conversations?
355

356 **Based on what we have learned in the last few weeks about this investigation, we**
357 **believe that some people may be trying to distort the meaning of the law in order to**
358 **undermine AIPAC, and indeed the entire pro-Israel movement.** In short, they are not
359 **only** suggesting that two members of our staff broke the law. They are also trying to
360 gather evidence that *AIPAC, by virtue of who we are and what we do, is violating the*
361 *law.*
362

363 I realize this is a serious statement. However, there a number of factors that point to such
364 a conclusion. I want to take a few moments to lay out for you what we have learned.
365

366 First of all, we have deep concerns about how this investigation has been conducted.
367 News reports indicate AIPAC has been under investigation for at least two years, yet the

368 first time AIPAC heard anything was the morning of August 27 when FBI agents
369 appeared at the home of one of our colleagues early in the morning. Rather than asking
370 us or them for information, or issuing a subpoena for information as is usually done in
371 such cases, law enforcement officials appeared that day at the AIPAC offices with a
372 search warrant and a team of 7 agents. For the first 10 days after this story broke, the
373 authorities refused to talk to us. Everything we learned about the investigation we
374 learned from leaks in the press. Since then, they have had only one substantive
375 meeting with our attorneys. ~~They have not even responded to our offers to provide them~~
376 ~~with any specific information they request.~~ One of our attorneys, who himself served as
377 an advisor to the Attorney General of the United States, told us that in 25 years of legal
378 practice he has seen no precedent for the Department of Justice's approach to this case.
379

380 Think about this. AIPAC has been around for half a century. Presidents, Vice Presidents
381 and virtually every high-level foreign policy official from Democratic and Republican
382 Administrations have addressed us. During the same two-year period that the
383 investigation of AIPAC has allegedly been going on, more than 37 high-level
384 Administration officials—including the President himself, the White House Chief of
385 Staff and the Secretary of State—have addressed AIPAC. In fact just last month, John
386 Bolton, the top State Department official responsible for overseeing policy toward Iran,
387 briefed AIPAC's Executive Committee.
388

389 National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice, was briefed on the FBI's inquiry into
390 AIPAC more than a year ago. Yet she continued to speak to me and other AIPAC leaders
391 on a regular basis, and approved the President's appearance before AIPAC in May. She
392 herself will be addressing us in a little more than an hour.
393

394 How is it that she—and other individuals at the highest echelon of the Administration—
395 continue to trust AIPAC and work with us, but the FBI believes it must use leaks to
396 smear us and the most aggressive investigative tactics at its disposal to intimidate us in
397 order to get information?
398

399 Secondly, I have spent 20 minutes describing to you in detail the conversations that took
400 place between AIPAC staff and Larry Franklin. Based on the limited information we
401 have learned from the authorities, what happened in these conversations is ostensibly
402 what the investigation is about.
403

404 We were surprised to learn, therefore, that most of the questions the FBI has posed to
405 individuals it has interviewed in connection with this investigation have had little to do
406 with Larry Franklin and his conversations with AIPAC staff. **Instead, most of the FBI's**
407 **questions have focused on the very nature of *how AIPAC works*.**
408

409 The FBI has been interviewing many people—both in and out of government—about
410 AIPAC. They have interviewed current and former diplomats and analysts at think tanks.
411 They have flown as far as Europe to conduct interviews. Their questions have not
412 focused primarily on Steve, Keith or Larry Franklin. Instead, they have focused on
413 AIPAC's role in affecting U.S. Middle East policy, from what the nature of our activities

414 were in discussions about the Road Map to U.S. policy toward Iran. In one such meeting,
415 the interviewee was actually asked to respond to the supposition that AIPAC is actually a
416 spying operation for Israel.

417

418 Finally, the fact that press reports have indicated that David Szady, a senior FBI
419 counterintelligence official who some Jewish organizations believe has targeted Jews for
420 investigation, is involved in the investigation, has only heightened our concerns.
421 According to these reports, Szady has targeted Jews and blocked or slowed their
422 clearances. He was directly involved in a high profile case involving a Jewish former
423 CIA staff attorney who sued the FBI, CIA and its top officials for religious
424 discrimination. (DO NOT USE UNTIL WE HAVE VERIFIED)

425

426 For all of these reasons, we have come to believe that this investigation is not just about
427 what was said, or heard or reported out of this or that conversation. We believe some
428 people are trying to launch an assault on our mission, our institution and our community.

429

430 The natural question to ask is, *why?*

431

432 (PAUSE)

433

434 We can't be sure. But we can make some educated guesses.

435

436 Clearly, in the post 9-11 environment in which we live, the FBI is under tremendous
437 pressure to investigate and prosecute espionage cases of any type. It takes only a few
438 over-zealous individuals to begin an investigation. Once it begins, it hard to stop no
439 matter what the merits. Then, once government officials decide to leak information
440 about an investigation to the media, there is even more pressure for the Justice
441 Department to show something for its work.

442

443 But we also have to consider the political climate surrounding this investigation.

444

445 First of all, it is important to consider the times and the foreign policy atmosphere in
446 which we live. Our nation, and this city, is engaged in an important—and divisive—
447 policy debate over America's Middle East policies that will affect America's future. The
448 rivalry among the Pentagon, State Department, National Security Council and
449 Intelligence agencies has been widely reported.

450

451 The divisions that also exist among different constituencies within each of these agencies
452 and organizations is less well known, but no less important. Lately, there has been a lot
453 written about the policy differences between the so-called neo-cons working at the
454 Pentagon who favored a more robust Middle East posture and other parts of the
455 permanent civil service within the Departments of Defense, State, and the CIA. There
456 are some people in the government who are concerned about the Bush Administration's
457 close relationship with Israel. It would not be surprising if AIPAC, which touches many
458 of the issues that divides these constituencies, got caught in the crossfire.

459

460 Secondly, anti-Israel attitudes persist within the permanent foreign policy and
461 intelligence bureaucracy in this country to this day. In the 50's, 60's, and 70's we used to
462 talk about those groups within the State Department who held anti-Israel attitudes. We
463 talk about them less today, but some people there still hold such attitudes. By working
464 with Congress to weigh in on America's Middle East policies, you have helped to make
465 them less relevant. But they are there. They don't like how close this White House is to
466 Israel. Some people, particularly in certain quarters of the intelligence community, share
467 the conviction that Israel constitutes the biggest espionage threat to America, a view that
468 is based in prejudice, not on the facts.

469

470 Against this backdrop, our concerns about the origins of this investigation and the
471 purposefully intimidating manner in which it has unfolded have only deepened.

472

473 (PAUSE)

474

475 I am sure that what you have just heard is disturbing to all of you. Many of you will
476 ask me "what can I do?" The purpose of this briefing is not to encourage you to act.
477 We promised to keep you, AIPAC's most dedicated leaders, up-to-date on what we have
478 learned about this investigation. That is why we are briefing you today.

479

480 For now, we need to let the legal process run its course. AIPAC and its employees are
481 represented by a group of experienced attorneys that includes not only the best legal
482 minds in Washington, but also individuals deeply committed to this institution and our
483 cause.

484

485 There will come a time in the future when there will be an opportunity for you to stand
486 and up and be counted. Right now, our first job is ensuring that these spurious
487 allegations are dropped and this investigation is ended.

488

489 But even then, our work will not be over. We must ensure that the legitimacy of the work
490 that we do as American citizens—lobbying to affect our nation's policies in the Middle
491 East and encouraging its friendship with Israel—is reaffirmed. We cannot abide any
492 suggestion that American citizens should be perceived as disloyal or involved in illegal
493 activities simply for seeking to participate in the decisions of their elected leaders.

494

495 My friends, think about it. If AIPAC is undermined, how will critical military aid to
496 Israel and humanitarian aid to more than x other nations pass?

497

498 If AIPAC is weakened, who will urge America to be strong in standing up for Israel's
499 right to defend itself at the United Nations?

500

501 If AIPAC is incapacitated, who will work to ensure that America's friendship with Israel
502 remains strong?

503

504 My friends, more than AIPAC's future is at stake. So is the future of the U.S.-Israel
505 relationship. In a world without AIPAC, Israel and America both lose. As the President

506 himself told many of us when he addressed our Policy Conference in May. "By
507 defending the freedom and prosperity of Israel, you're also serving the cause of America.
508 Our nation is stronger and safer because we have a true and dependable ally in Israel."

509
510 You and I must ensure that AIPAC is neither slowed nor silenced. Even as we fight these
511 outrageous allegations, we cannot be distracted from our mission.

512
513 *Next week*, 435 members of Congress and 33 Senator will be elected. We must reach out
514 to all of them—the old friends and potential new ones among them.

515
516 *Next year* when Congress reconvenes, it will consider new legislation aimed at stopping
517 Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and advancing America's war on terror. We must
518 make our voices heard on these and other issues.

519
520 *And in the future*, we must ensure that AIPAC continues to grow to enable us to be
521 anywhere where the future of the U.S.-Israel relationship is at stake.

522
523 in our synagogues encouraging more American Jews to get involved;

524
525 in the meeting places of our fellow Americans from different ethnic and religious
526 groups to enlist them as allies in this cause;

527
528 in our city halls and statehouses exposing our leaders to how U.S.-Israeli
529 innovations can make all America safer;

530
531 **NEEDS CLOSING LINE**

532
533 With that, we'll take some questions.

534
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539